Visual Polarisation: Instagram’s Role in Shaping Collective Identities. The case of 2023 General Elections in Spain

Following the previously mentioned studies, we assume the hypothesis (H1) that political actors prioritized those visuals including the mobilization use, instead of other uses like information diffusion or social interaction, as an affective polarization in which traits of populist resources (symbolism and antagonism between the people and the elite) were present.

Previous studies show that negative campaigning is a key polarization strategy on social media, used by political actors on social media (Klinger et al., 2023; Jungherr, 2016). This strategy involves promoting one’s image while criticizing opponents’ programs, track records, or mistakes often focusing on both true and false attacks on their character (Nai & Maier, 2021; Marcos-García, et al., 2021). Emerging parties, with shorter histories, typically emphasize opponents’ flaws rather than promoting their own merits, focusing more on criticism than proposals (Valli & Nai, 2020).

Candidates and parties used Instagram during campaigns for negative campaigning, focusing on criticizing opponents’ professional abilities (H2). Positive judgments and praise for achievements, especially by governing parties, were also used to promote their management (H3). Additionally, studies show that the strategic use of the thematic agenda can drive polarization (Gidron et al., 2020; Harteveld, 2021). Conservative leaders emphasize issues like immigration and terrorism, while progressives focus on social policies and corruption, promoting controversial topics to reinforce loyalties and distinguish political groups (Alonso-Muñoz & Casero Ripollés, 2018; Smith, 2015).

It is important to anticipate a different strategic use of Instagram among political actors to differentiate themselves from their adversaries, primarily through their electoral program and political ideology (H4). This differentiation, measured in terms of policy, will prioritise precise programmatic proposals that define the specificity of that political actor.

2. Material and Methods

2.1 Sampling Design

The research sample included the official Instagram accounts of the four main political parties in Spain’s July 23, 2023 general elections (PSOE, PP, VOX, Sumar), which received over 3% of the vote, as well as the profiles of their candidates (Pedro Sánchez, Alberto Núñez-Feijóo, Santiago Abascal and Yolanda Díaz). This sample represented a significant portion of the Spanish political spectrum, excluding smaller regional and minor parties due to their limited national parliamentary influence.

The subject of this analysis is the electoral campaign for the general elections of 2023 in Spain. It is an attractive object of study since the call for elections came unexpectedly when the President of the Government, Pedro Sánchez, facing the decline of its party in the regional and municipal elections in May 2023, decided on May 29 to call general elections for July of that same year, just two months later. The sample includes all Instagram posts from the official profiles of the candidates and political parties during the two-week electoral campaign (July 8–23, 2023). Instagram stories were excluded due to coding difficulties, and only posts from the profiles’ feeds were analysed. The dataset consisted of photographs and videos (57% of the posts were videos), with coding based on the first minute of each video. Most images included captions, which were considered for coding. In posts with multiple photos, only the first image was coded, resulting in a total of N=668 images (Table 1). For the sake of completeness, the coding of this sample was carried out between 1 and 31 August of the same year, 2023, so that later or earlier modifications in the publications of these profiles have not been considered.

2.2 Coding and Variables

Following quantitative content analysis parameters, 668 images were coded, with each image serving as the unit of analysis. A detailed set of categories was developed to address the research questions. The analysis differentiated between the accounts of the four political parties and their respective candidates, grouping them into right-wing (PP and VOX) and left-wing (PSOE and Sumar) groups. Formal aspects, such as visual resources and editing, were also analysed.

The functionality of each post, that is, the intention of the image or video, was assessed based on its action, classified into: (1) mobilization to attend congresses or vote, (2) interaction to share posts or related content, and (3) dissemination of information to keep the public informed through press conferences, writings, and other informative documents.

Populist discourse was identified by examining the antagonism between the people and the elite, with types of populism inspired by Mudde’s (2004) research and adapted to the ad hoc survey of our own created for this study. Post-populist discourse has thus been coded according to the connotations it possesses, such as (1) blaming the elite for problems (blaming bureaucratic, political, or economic elites, among others, for the problems faced by ordinary people); (2) questioning the legitimacy of elite decisions (questioning whether the elite is prepared to make decisions, usually through comparisons with previous decisions or actions in private life); (3) calling for resistance against the elite (the population is asked to oppose decisions imposed by the elite); and (4) accusing the elite of betraying the people (elites are accused of going against the interests of citizens, as well as lying in decision-making).

Additionally, this group includes what kind of elite is the criticism aimed at (politicians, the system, bureaucrats, the economic elite, the media, social media owners, or the supranational elite), and the type of references made to the people (whether the post includes references to a “we” or, conversely, if the reference is to a "Dangerous Others," generally minorities or other political groups). Similarly, the strategic use of symbols was recorded, including patriotic symbols, such as the national flag, or religious symbols.

Another important feature has been negative campaigning. Following Marcos-García et al. (2021) negative campaign was measured by differentiating who the attack was directed towards or what mode of criticism was made (attacks on professional competence, ideological position, association with individuals or other parties, future results, moral stance and credibility, appearance or past actions). We also considered the source of the negative action (which candidate or party) and who the target of the criticism was.

The main topics discussed in the publication were coded such as climate change, public health, pensions, and education. These topics were conveyed through textual elements (text, slogans or quotes) and visual elements (photos or graphs). The publication’s goal could be to highlight issues, criticize political opponents, or present solutions.

Before the full coding, a manual pre-test analysis was conducted among six coders using a sample of 67 posts (10%) that were analysed in successive phases to establish the same criteria for analysis. Both the analysis and the pre-test were carried out by researchers both universities. Two meetings were held to explain the variables based on a codebook distributed to each of the coders. Some of the comments made during the coding phases were related to more controversial variables. The pre-test was quite acceptable for nearly all variables (Holsti SR coefficient > 70). Once adequate results from the pre-test were obtained, the global coding of the entire sample was developed.

3. Results

Overall all political actors were active on Instagram during the 2023 electoral campaign (Table 1). Specifically, political parties were slightly more active than candidates (51.9% vs. 48.1%). Among all actors, the presence of Vox (21.4%) and its leader, Santiago Abascal (21.4%), stands out as the most active throughout the campaign. In contrast, the least active on his official profiles was the president himself, Pedro Sánchez (4.9%), and the Partido Popular (5.8%).

From a formal perspective, traditional photos without text predominated (67.2%) compared to images with some short text (28.4%), as well as some graphics or illustrations with text (13.9%), but it was more anecdotal. Additionally, 28.9% included more than one image in a carousel format. However, some significant differences were detected by ideological blocs, as political actors on the left-wing used graphics or illustrations with text in one out of four publications more than their counterparts on the right-wing (25% vs. 7.7%) (χ2: 23.747<.001).

Below are the main results for each research question, starting with the overall findings, followed by differences between the two ideological blocs on the left-right axis.

RQ1: To what extent did the different Spanish political actors use Instagram visuals to mobilise their followers compared to other uses of the platform?

In the context of the electoral campaign, Instagram was primarily used for voter mobilisation (55.1%), with much less emphasis on informational (2.7%) and interactive (1%) purposes. Most mobilisation posts focused on encouraging voting (50.4%) and, to a lesser extent, participating in electoral activities (6%). Both ideological blocs had similar goals, but the right-wing bloc made greater use of mobilisation calls (60.8%) compared to the left-wing bloc (47.3%) (χ2: 11.890<.001). Additionally, calls to vote or vote for a specific party were more frequent in the right-wing bloc than in the left-wing (57.9% vs. 40.3%) (χ2: 20.302<.001).

It is generally observed that 66% of the posts do not exhibit antagonism between the people and the elites in any form, so they could not be included as populist resources. Among the units labelled as populist, there was a significantly greater presence from right-wing political actors (47.8%) compared to those from the left-wing (15.2%) (χ2: 77.257 <.001). Only one in four posts (24%) mentioned alternative groups, particularly political or ideological minorities (21.9%). Furthermore, these data were more evident among the right-wing than the left-wing bloc (31.4% compared to 8.8%) (χ2: 48.754 <.001). In this regard, the right-wing bloc mentions the people as a populist strategy in one out of four publications (29.4%), while the left-wing does so in one out of ten (9.2%) (χ2: 40.242 <.001). Similarly, the right wing tends to blame the elite more (21.6%) than the left wing (3.2%) (χ2: 46.39 <.001).

Regarding the type of populism, the most notable aspect was blaming the elite for the problems faced by the people (5.9%) and discrediting the elite (5.9%). This also explains the high number of posts with negative campaigning, and how they use it to generate feelings such as anger or shame about the opposing political elites. To a lesser extent, the legitimacy of the decisions made by the elite was questioned (only 2.8%). Likewise, significant differences were detected between ideological blocs: the right-wing blames the elite for the people’s problems more than the left-wing (8.6% vs. 1.1%, χ2: 18.048 <.001). The right-wing accuses the elite of betraying the people more than the left-wing (7.8% compared to 2.1%, χ2: 10.292 <.001) (Figure 1). Additionally, the right-wing questions the legitimacy of the elite to make decisions in some of its publications (4.9%), while the left wing does not use this type of resource (χ2: 14.375 <.001).

Figure 1. Populism that attacks a political position regarding the problems faced by the people

Source: @partidopopular, 20/06/2023 (https://bit.ly/3B0JRWx).

Among the criticisms detected, politicians become the primary target (7.6%), both from the right-wing (12.5%) and the left-wing (1.1%) (χ2: 30.09 <.001). Following this, criticisms were directed towards bureaucrats (2.8%), a group mentioned only by the right-wing (4.9%) (χ2: 14.375 <.001), and the media (3%), where PP and Vox direct more critics (4.7%) than the left-wing (0.7%) (χ2: 8.845 <.003).

The use of symbols in posts as a mobilising strategy primarily consisted of patriotic symbols, such as the national flag or coats of arms (30.4%), which generates a patriotic feeling among the public. Half of the publications from the right-wing contain these symbols (49.6%), while leftist parties do so rarely (only 4.2%) (χ2: 158.714 <.001).

RQ2: Did the different political actors use negative campaigning against their opponents as part of their visual polarisation strategy on Instagram during the campaign?

Negativity or attacks in the campaign messages on Instagram were not predominant (31.3%). Most of these attacks were ideological (32.6%), followed by professional attacks (18.6%), and personal attacks (13.9%). It is noteworthy how candidates were slightly more attacked than political parties (16.6% compared to 13.8%). About the ideological spectrum, right-wing political actors made greater use of all types of attacks, primarily targeting ideological positioning (41.6%), thus doubling those used by the left-wing (20.5%) (χ2: 32.917 <.001). Overall, the PSOE received the majority of the criticism from both political groups (18%), with the left-wing targeting it as well (1.8%) (χ2: 87.413 <.001). This trend also appeared in the right-wing, where the PP was the second party to receive the most negative criticism (13.9%) from both the left-wing (23.3%) and right-wing (7%) (χ2: 36.200 <.001). Sumar and Vox did not receive attacks from their counterparts within the same ideological spectrum. Thus, the left-wing actors attacked Vox (13.4%), while the right-wing did not mention this party in its attacks (0%) (χ2: 54.814 <.001). The same happened with Sumar, which did not receive criticism from the left-wing (0%), while it did from the right-wing (9.6%) (χ2: 28.792 <.001).

Regarding the type of attack, we observe a notable presence of attacks on past political performance or political management (14.8%), which the right-wing uses up to three times more than the left-wing (20% compared to 7.8%) (χ2: 19.313 <.001). Additionally, attacks on credibility, moral positions, or integrity of political actors were present (12.1%), and attacks on their ideological positioning (7.9%) (Figura 2). The left-wing leads by seven points (7.1%) over the right-wing (1.6%) in attacks on future political actions, though both camps show low presence (χ2: 19.313 <.001).

Figure 2. Attack on the ideological positioning of the leader of the Popular Party

Source: @yolanda_diaz, 16/07/2023 (https://bit.ly/4hYxniQ).

RQ3: Did the different political actors use self-praise to project a positive image among their followers as part of their visual polarisation strategy on Instagram during the campaign?

Similarly, messages on Instagram helped to project a positive image of the candidate or political party in the form of praises. Most posts included this type of positive judgment (51.3%). Specifically, the most widely used was expressions of applause or gestures of affection from attendees (20.8%), followed by praise regarding future results (16.5%), commendations on the credibility or moral stance of the political actor (10.6%), and even praise for previous political performance (8.5%). The left-wing bloc notably leaned towards the latter type of praise to a greater extent (15.5%), almost five times more than the right-wing (3.4%) (p: 30.957<.001).

Regarding the recipients of these praises, candidates won more of them. Santiago Abascal received the highest praise (40.9%), followed at a considerable distance by Yolanda Díaz (25.9%), Alberto Núñez Feijóo (20.5%) and Pedro Sánchez (19.2%). Among the parties, VOX achieved the highest percentage of praise (11.8%) compared to the others. Additionally, it is worth noting the high rate of praise directed at ordinary individuals (34.6%) and the media (12.4%) (Table 2).

If we distinguish between ideologies, Abascal receives the most praise from the right-wing (65.5%), although there is also some praise for Abascal from the left-wing (7.4%) (p: 227.316<.001). Closely following is Díaz, who receives 57.6% of her praises from the left-wing (compared to 2.6% from the right-wing) (p: 257.095<.001). Surprisingly, Núñez Feijóo received praise not only from the right-wing (25.5%) but also from the left-wing (13.8%) (p: 13.634<.001). Regarding Sánchez, there was no significant difference in the praises he received between the two blocs. Contrarily, the media received praise from all political actors, although it was more pronounced from the right-wing (15.6% compared to 8.1%) (p: 8.336<.004).

RQ4: Did the political actors participating in this campaign use their thematic agenda strategically to promote political polarisation and attract their supporters?

Regarding the thematic agenda in the images, candidates and political parties emphasised content mostly related to activities stemming from the electoral campaign (42.5%), followed by original material directly from the campaign (21.3%). To a lesser extent, the topic of the posts focused on working with the media (12.9%), followed by units dedicated to projecting the political positioning of the political actors (8.2%) (Table 3).

The most significant difference between ideological groups emerges in the strategic topics (policy) used. While the left-wing prioritised policies focused on welfare (27.6%) and the rights of individuals (20.5%), the right-wing presented a more diverse thematic approach such as welfare (14%) shared prominence with crime (12.2%), agriculture (9.4%), and delinquency (8.8%) (Table 4).

4. Discussion and conclusions

This research provides various original and significant contributions regarding the presence of visual polarisation strategies in the Instagram use among political actors during the electoral campaign for the 2023 general elections in Spain.

First, results demonstrate that political actors use Instagram predominantly to mobilise the electorate. All political actors, especially those aligned with the right-wing, agree on exploiting Instagram’s potential to engage voters, explicitly requesting their votes and encouraging participation in campaign events. This strategy aligns Instagram with other social media platforms, where previous studies have also observed similar dynamics, using these platforms as essential tools to disseminate their messages, generate debate, and foster civic participation.

Through these visuals, they aim to connect directly with voters, influencing their opinions and motivating them to actively participate in the elections, whether through voting or supporting specific initiatives or campaigns. This confirms the first hypothesis (H1), which suggested that calls for mobilization and voter participation in campaign events played a primary role in the strategies of political actors, overtaking other actions such as interaction or information dissemination.

Second, findings indicate that, unexpectedly, populist narratives played a secondary role in the 2023 electoral campaign. Among the two ideological groups analysed, the right-wing political actors employed this resource mainly to blame the political elites represented by their opponents for the problems facing the people, aligning with previous studies (Gidron et al., 2020).

Alongside this trend, polarization strategies use symbols as a key resource to reinforce collective identities and consolidate cohesion within groups. These symbols help simplify political messages and strengthen the sense of belonging. In this context, right-wing parties took advantage of Instagram’s visual elements to disseminate national symbols, such as the flag, with the aim of reaffirming their identity and values of Instagram’s visuals to share national symbols, such as the national flag.

Third, this study demonstrates the presence of negative campaigning as a strategy for the visual polarisation of political actors on Instagram due to It shows how political actors take advantage of the disintermediation offered by social networks to attack, criticise, and express their dissatisfaction and disagreement regarding their opponents (Jungherr, 2016). Three factors affect this strategy: the type of political actor, the ideology, and the background. First, negative campaigning serves as a preferred mechanism for criticising political leaders over parties, thus enhancing the personalisation of politics, where, in this case, attacks increasingly focus on individuals and their traits and capacities rather than on political parties, ideologies, or collective groups. Regarding the ideological axis, political actors allied with the right-wing exploit criticism in their messages more than the rest. This is a distinct dynamic from that observed on other key social media such as Facebook, where left-wing parties most frequently employ attacks in their digital communication strategies. Finally, the focus of the criticisms concentrates on the traditional parties instead of the extreme parties.

Conversely, the results demonstrate a similar strategy in the type of attack employed by political actors, focusing on the professional profiles of their adversaries and their ideological or moral values. Far from commenting on the character or personal traits of their rivals, political actors use Instagram to launch direct attacks on their programs, backgrounds, or mistakes they may have made in their professional roles (Marcos-García et al., 2021), thus confirming the second hypothesis of this research (H2).

Our fourth finding reveals the presence of achievements and praises in the messages of political actors as a strategy for visual polarisation on Instagram. It is observed that the posts shared by parties and leaders intended to launch a positive image of themselves, mainly showcasing the recognition, affection, and support from their followers or close groups. These results align with studies by Lindholm et al. (2021) and Quevedo-Redondo and Portalés-Oliva (2017), which identify Instagram as a preferred social network for projecting political leadership. The results point to Abascal and Díaz as the candidates who received the most praise, which differs from previous studies suggesting that newly emerged political actors refuse to concentrate their strategy on their achievements, which are generally fewer than those obtained by traditional parties (Valli & Nai, 2020). These results partially differ from H3, where parties on the left-wing – PSOE and Sumar – were expected to exploit this strategy more than the rest. While both share a significant amount of praise for their government’s management, the focus of compliments during the 2023 electoral campaign goes to the candidate of Vox.

The final contribution of this research refers to the thematic agenda, revealing both similarities and differences among the various ideological groups. Both left and right-wing parties and candidates agree on strategically using Instagram for political purposes, focusing their posts on aspects related to power dynamics and competition, concentrating on issues related to the electoral campaign, political debates, or negotiations between parties. This strategy contradicts H4, which expected political actors to seek to differentiate themselves from their opponents primarily through their electoral program and ideology. However, when they focus on politics, more significant ideological differences were found. According to previous literature, while progressive parties and leaders emphasise issues related to the welfare state and civil rights, conservative representatives prioritised crime as a topic (Alonso-Muñoz & Casero Ripollés, 2018). These latter topics gain prominence in VOX’s profile, which mobilised fear and concern around national security and cultural identity by emphasising the perception of insecurity in Spain, often associated with immigration.

Despite the results, it is important to note the limitations of this research. The absence of Instagram stories, which are only available for 24 hours, limited access to all content shared by political parties and leaders, potentially missing distinctions not captured in this study. Additionally, considering the impact of populist narratives on the growth of polarisation, this research has focused on one of its essential characteristics: identifying antagonism between the people and the elite. However, it would be interesting to explore other aspects, such as message framing or underlying motivations.

The relevance of the findings obtained and the appropriateness of the analysed period represents a novel contribution and emphasizes that the use of Instagram depends on various factors that lead political actors to lean more towards specific polarisation strategies in their electoral communication. This study contributes to the literature on visual political communication and deepens our understanding of social media’s role in polarization, especially Instagram. It highlights the role of images in division and the need for further exploration of media strategies in a polarized society.

Author’s Contribution

Silvia Marcos-García: Conceptualization; Investigation; Writing – original draft; Writing – review & editing; Supervision; Funding acquisition. Rocío Zamora Medina: Data curation; Investigation; Formal analysis; Methodology; Writing – original draft; Writing – review & editing. Marina Egea Barquero: Data curation; Investigation; Formal analysis; Visualization; Writing – original draft. All authors have read and agree to the published version of the manuscript.

Conflicts of interest

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Funding sources

This research is part of the R&D project with reference UJI-2023-14, funded by the Universitat Jaume I within the 2023 Research Promotion Plan; and the project ‘COST Action ‘Redressing Radical Polarisation: Strengthening European Civil Spheres faceing Illiberal Digital Media’ (DepolarisingEU) CA22165.

Acknowledgments

This publication is part of the “Digital Election Campaigning Worldwide (DigiWorld)” project. The authors would like to express their gratitude to all contributors who contributed to the project infrastructure and the creation of the dataset used in this publication. A complete list of collaborators can be found on the project website: https://digidemo.ifkw.lmu.de/digiworld/.

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