European projects and media literacy in the face of disinformation: strategies for knowledge transfer in the Horizon 2020 Programme

Proyectos europeos y alfabetización mediática ante la desinformación: estrategias para la transferencia de conocimiento en el Programa Horizonte 2020

Projetos europeus e alfabetização mediática diante da desinformação: estratégias para transferência de conhecimento no Programa Horizonte 2020

Beatriz Molina Lomba1*
Jordi Rodríguez Virgili1**
Jorge Miguel Rodríguez Rodríguez2***

1 School of Communication (FCOM), University of Navarra (UNAV), Pamplona, Spain
2 University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain
* Researcher in the Department of Public Communication, School of Communication (FCOM), University of Navarra (UNAV), Pamplona, Spain. Email: bmolinalomb@alumni.unav.es (autora de correspondencia)
** Professor of Political Communication, School of Communication (FCOM), University of Navarra (UNAV), Pamplona, Spain. Email: jrvirgili@unav.es
*** Lecturer and researcher of Journalism at the University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain. Email: j.rodriguezr@unizar.es

Received: 25/03/2025; Revised: 18/04/2025; Accepted: 22/09/2025; Published: 17/11/2025

Translation to English: Ana María Ayala Casellas of TRIDIOM S.L

To cite this article: Molina Lomba, Beatriz; Rodríguez Virgili, Jordi; & Rodríguez Rodríguez, Jorge Miguel. (2025). European projects and media literacy in the face of disinformation: Strategies for knowledge transfer in the Horizon 2020 Programme. ICONO 14. Scientific Journal of Communication and Emerging Technologies, 23(1): e2247. https://doi.org/10.7195/ri14.v23i1.2247

Abstract

This study examines whether Horizon 2020 projects have succeeded in transforming their research outcomes into effective digital tools to strengthen critical thinking in society through media and information literacy. Moreover, it identifies the barriers that have hindered this process and proposes recommendations to enhance its social impact and optimise future European programmes. The article adopts a mixed-methods approach combining a content analysis of the dissemination plans of twelve H2020 projects on disinformation with a qualitative analysis based on nine interviews with project researchers and fact-checkers. The findings reveal a lack of standardised strategies and the limited effectiveness of dissemination activities, despite efforts through social media, events, and collaborations. Furthermore, many technological tools are directed at journalists and educators, leaving the general public as an afterthought. Despite their contributions to academia, knowledge transfer remains a challenge that hinders progress towards the goal of the H2020 Programme to combat disinformation.

Keywords
Educommunication; Disinformation; Digital tools; Horizon 2020; Critical thinking; European Union.

Resumen

Este estudio examina si los proyectos del Programa Horizonte 2020 han logrado transformar sus resultados de investigación en herramientas digitales efectivas para fortalecer el pensamiento crítico de la sociedad mediante la alfabetización mediática e informacional. Asimismo, identifica las barreras que han obstaculizado este proceso y propone recomendaciones para ampliar su impacto social y optimizar futuros programas europeos. El artículo emplea un enfoque mixto que combina un análisis de contenido de los planes de difusión de doce proyectos del H2020 sobre desinformación, y un análisis cualitativo basado en nueve entrevistas a investigadores de esos proyectos y especialistas en verificación. Los resultados evidencian la falta de estrategias homogéneas y la limitada eficacia de las acciones de difusión, pese a los esfuerzos en redes sociales, eventos y colaboraciones. Además, muchas herramientas tecnológicas están dirigidas a periodistas y educadores, dejando en segundo plano al público general. A pesar de sus aportes al ámbito académico, la transferencia de conocimiento continúa siendo un reto que limita los avances hacia el objetivo del Programa H2020 de combatir la desinformación.

Palabras clave
Educomunicación; Desinformación; Herramientas digitales; Horizonte 2020; Pensamiento crítico; Unión Europea.

Resumo

Este estudo examina se os projetos do Programa Horizonte 2020 conseguiram transformar seus resultados de pesquisa em ferramentas digitais eficazes para fortalecer o pensamento crítico da sociedade por meio da alfabetização midiática e informacional. Além disso, identifica as barreiras que dificultaram esse processo e propõe recomendações para ampliar seu impacto social e otimizar futuros programas europeus. O artigo adota uma abordagem mista, combinando uma análise de conteúdo dos planos de disseminação de doze projetos do H2020 sobre desinformação, com uma análise qualitativa baseada em nove entrevistas com pesquisadores desses projetos e especialistas em verificação. Os resultados evidenciam a ausência de estratégias homogêneas e a eficácia limitada das ações de disseminação, apesar dos esforços em redes sociais, eventos e colaborações. Ademais, muitas ferramentas tecnológicas são direcionadas a jornalistas e educadores, relegando o público em geral a um papel secundário. Apesar de suas contribuições acadêmicas, a transferência de conhecimento continua a ser um desafio que limita os avanços em direção ao objetivo do Programa H2020 de combater a desinformação.

Palavras-chave
Educomunicação; Desinformação; Ferramentas digitais; Horizonte 2020; Pensamento crítico; União Europeia.

1. Introduction

Society has experienced a significant change in the scale and speed of the impact of disinformation over the last decade. The Internet and social media have created an ecosystem where fake news is camouflaged as truth, while simultaneously forming the backbone of contemporary communication strategies (Astudillo, 2024; Mazur & Chochia, 2022). Disinformation seeks political manipulation, increased polarisation, social destabilisation, or economic gain. These overarching goals are found across multiple contexts and at varying levels of intensity (McKay & Tenove, 2021).

The impact of this phenomenon sows doubt, fear or controversy around any kind of information—economic, political, social, health-related, etc.—polarises citizens, reinforces biased beliefs, fosters institutional distrust, and emotionally manipulates electoral decisions (Freelon & Wells, 2020; De-Saint-Laurent et al., 2022).

In this context, Media and Information Literacy (MIL), defined by UNESCO (2020) as “a core competency to address disinformation”, which “contributes to access to information, freedom of expression, the protection of privacy, the prevention of violent extremism, the promotion of digital safety, and the fight against hate speech and inequality”, takes on particular relevance (Bustos-Díaz & Martin-Vicario, 2024, p. 2).

Media literacy is the ability to access, analyse, evaluate and create media messages in a variety of contexts and formats (Aufderheide, 1993; Livingstone, 2004). It entails critical thinking skills that enable individuals to interpret media content in a reflective and conscious manner, distinguishing between different types of media and understanding the processes behind media production (Sádaba & Salaverría, 2023). In short, the aim is to train the audience in behaviour and habits in order to improve their information consumption.

The European Union earmarked €77.028 billion for the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme (2014-2020) to boost scientific excellence, European industrial leadership and address social and digital challenges, including the then-nascent issue of disinformation. Technology platforms, advertisers, experts and other stakeholders collaborated to strengthen media literacy and ensure informed democratic participation (García-Roca & de-Amo, 2023).

However, the EU's formal commitment was consolidated in 2017, following the US elections and Brexit, with the creation of the High-Level Expert Group on Disinformation (HLEG, 2018), whose report guided public policies (HLEG, 2018; Becerra-Basterrechea, 2022). In 2019, ahead of the European Parliament elections, the Action Plan against Disinformation was launched, based on four pillars:

1.Enhancing institutional capacity to detect, analyse and expose it.

2.Strengthening coordinated responses.

3.Mobilising the private sector.

4.Increasing societal resilience.

1.1. Evaluation of the Action Plan against Disinformation

In 2020, the European Court of Auditors conducted an audit to assess the degree of compliance with the objectives proposed by the 2018 European Action Plan against Disinformation. It found that the Plan “was relevant in its conception, but incomplete.” This was because, while it successfully addressed the need to involve European institutions, Member States, researchers, fact-checkers, communication professionals, and civil society, among others, it failed to define their coordination. Consequently, although the EU considered the cross-cutting nature and scope of the issue, it failed to converge the efforts of all the stakeholders involved (Tribunal de Cuentas Europeo, 2021, p. 15).

In particular, researchers—agents of social transformation from academia—and fact-checkers, tasked with cross-checking information in the media, play a key role in the implementation of European projects against disinformation. The former provide critical analysis, rigorous methodologies and promote interdisciplinary knowledge networks to understand the social impact of disinformation. The latter intervene directly in the digital ecosystem by means of technological tools, verification protocols and a broad presence on social media and messaging platforms. Their complementary action facilitates the detection of false narratives, and drives educational strategies to strengthen media literacy, citizen participation, and democratic resilience against deceptive discourse (Martínez-Madrigal, et al., 2022; Tejedor & Sancho-Ligorred, 2023).

The audit also noted that the Action Plan lacked a comprehensive media literacy strategy and that EU and Member State initiatives were not coordinated, which reduced its social impact (Tribunal de Cuentas Europeo, 2021, p. 42). It adds that “most of the projects analysed produced tangible results, but many did not demonstrate sufficient scale and scope”. In fact, it was noted that the most positive results had been developed based on earlier initiatives (2021, p. 43).

No intention was detected to share effective digital practices or to establish an efficient evaluation framework to measure the impact of the tools developed. This is of concern since “such a framework is essential for the long-term development of social resilience, as it ensures that lessons learned influence future actions, policies and strategies” (Tribunal de Cuentas Europeo, 2021, p. 46).

In a broader context, these shortcomings reflect an institutional problem: the absence of a clear and unified strategy, with direct consequences for society and its media literacy (Seijas, 2020).

1.2. Disinformation on the H2020 Programme

Through the Horizon 2020 programme, specific projects were commissioned to research disinformation and investigate how it is generated, disseminated and received. Researchers and professionals were also encouraged to collaborate on developing digital tools and strategies to mitigate it and help society identify it. This included technologies, such as artificial intelligence and data analysis, to detect patterns of disinformation and develop MIL campaigns. Therefore, the H2020 Programme rewarded the academic contribution to sharing knowledge and disseminating it throughout society.

This is consistent with the “third mission” of the university, recognised as a core function by the Law of Science, which is knowledge transfer; that is, returning the generated knowledge to society in order to solve problems and improve its environments (García-Gordillo et al., 2025). Knowledge transfer comprises “those activities linked to the generation, application, use and exploitation of university technology and knowledge outside the academic environment, through interaction with the rest of society” (Galindo et al., 2011, p.114). It is not limited to mere academic publication, but involves converting research into tangible solutions with impact (Genaut-Arratibel et al., 2022). It involves generating social value through collaborative interactions, consulting activities, joint projects or the creation of innovative environments that allow knowledge to be applied to real-world problems (Perkmann et al., 2013).

Consequently, knowledge transfer regarding disinformation and media literacy are closely linked because they share the goal of creating informed, engaged and empowered individuals. By transferring research findings, including the use of technologies, to society, citizens are made aware and empowered to access, analyse, evaluate and produce diverse content (Chandra, 2019).

The battle is still raging, and institutional concern has intensified. Indeed, disinformation represents the top global risk for the coming years, according to the annual Global Risks Report from the Foro Económico Mundial (FEM, 2025). In view of this situation, we consider it pertinent to review and analyse the dissemination strategies of European projects, as essential means to achieve impact and knowledge transfer, thereby enabling society to fight disinformation using the tools proposed by these projects.

Based on this premise, Sádaba and Salaverría (2023, p. 27) emphasize the importance of educating the population in media skills in order to defend themselves against the hoaxes they encounter with increasing frequency and sophistication. Even if institutions are strengthened and strive to protect citizens, we must be prepared to face possible disinformation campaigns that the EU fails to eradicate.

Thus, this study explores whether the findings obtained translate into effective mechanisms or technological tools to strengthen society’s critical thinking through media literacy, helping it to distinguish between truthful and false information. It also explores the reasons—from the researchers of the projects analysed themselves—why this has not been possible and, as a result, provides recommendations for improving the social scope of similar initiatives in the future and strengthening specific aspects at the European level.

While Sánchez-González et al. (2024) analysed the transfer actions developed by Spanish and international research projects institutionally based in the Iberian Peninsula focused on disinformation, this research focuses on analysing twelve European projects funded under H2020. This interest is expressed in the following research questions:

Question 1: What strategies do the selected projects from the Horizon 2020 Programme employ to disseminate their progress and results?

Question 2: Which of these dissemination strategies should be maintained or modified to support effective transfer that creates social impact and improves media literacy?

The hypothesis is that the dissemination strategies of H2020 projects on disinformation enable an initial transfer of knowledge, but are not effective enough to drive media literacy on a large scale, which makes it difficult to achieve the programme’s essential goal of helping citizens to combat disinformation.

2. Material and methods

The study adopts an exploratory qualitative approach, combining a content analysis of H2020-funded project documentation with semi-structured interviews with project members and fact-checkers. This analysis builds on a first study entitled ‘El desafío de la Unión Europea ante la desinformación: análisis y balance de los proyectos europeos financiados en el marco del Programa Horizonte 2020’ (Molina-Lomba, et al., 2023) [The Challenge of the European Union in the Face of Disinformation: Analysis and Assessment of European Projects Funded under the Horizon 2020 Programme]. This research was conducted in different phases:

-Phase One: It was verified that the sample drawn in the initial study remained representative and, therefore, valid. The thirteen projects analysed in 2023, shown in Table 1, were selected based on four criteria, which also had to be met in this second phase of the research: being part of H2020; having the primary or secondary objective of combating disinformation; having a completed project status; and having the results reports published on the EU website.

One of the thirteen projects in the final sample was found not to meet the criteria. Upon reviewing the European Commission’s database, Cordis EU research results, a variation was identified in the completion deadline for the LEMAN project, which had changed from 30 September 2022 to 30 September 2023, with no results reports published.

To verify that the change was unrelated to the research, a double-check was performed: the website’s last update (July 2023) was reviewed, along with the technical datasheet downloaded in 2022, when the initial study was conducted. This document, together with the website, revealed that the original completion date was 2022, but that the Commission had extended it to 2023.

Consequently, the sample consists of twelve completed projects with published results reports. The selected projects are: SOMA, Provenance, SocialTruth, Eunomia, WeVerify, Co-Informe, Fandango, InVID, QUEST, TRESCA, MIRROR and COMPROP.

-Phase Two: Once the final sample was determined, a content analysis of documentary and digital sources was carried out. First, the projects’ dissemination plans were studied. These, which group together the actions undertaken to raise awareness of the digital projects, referred to the European Commission’s [Comisión Europea] report on Science with and for Society (2017), which states that EU-funded projects must design a comprehensive strategy to connect the research agenda with emerging social challenges and the dissemination of knowledge derived from innovation (Gertrudix et al., 2020, p. 3).

In order to ensure a representative analysis, additional data not included in the plans were collected manually through social media and project websites. As a result, the figures presented reflect an approximate and not an absolute reality.

-Phase Three: To contextualise the data obtained from the qualitative analysis, the study was complemented with in-depth interviews with project members and specialised fact-checkers. This methodology enables information to be collected on a specific topic, combining theoretical knowledge and practical experience (Varguillas-Carmona and Ribot-de-Flores, 2007, p. 250).

The research teams of the twelve projects were contacted and five of them agreed to participate (42%), providing their views on the dissemination of their projects. So as to broaden the perspective on media literacy, interviews were conducted with four fact-checkers from three of the main Spanish platforms: Maldita.es, Newtral and Salud Sin Bulos. They play a key role in validating information and providing expertise in media literacy and the use of digital tools.

The interviews were conducted online, lasting approximately 35 minutes, and were divided into two groups: research staff and fact-checkers. This enabled specific questionnaires to be designed, which explored, from two complementary perspectives, whether the communication strategies of European projects foster critical thinking, and which aspects could be improved (questionnaires available on request). Responses were coded according to Table 2, ensuring the anonymity of the participants.

Table 1. Projects forming part of the Horizon 2020 Programme that made up the initial sample

Project acronyms

Name of the project

SOMA

Social Observatory for Disinformation and Social Media Analysis

Provenance

Providing Verification Assistance for New Content

SocialTruth

Open Distributed Digital Content Verification for Hyper- connected Sociality

EUNOMIA

User-oriented, secure, trustful & decentralised social media

WeVerify

Wider and enhanced verification for you

Co-Inform

Co-creating misinformation-resilient societies

Fandango

Fake news discovery and propagation from Big Data analysis and artificial intelligence operations

InVID

In Video Veritas – Verification of social media video content for the news industry

QUEST

Quality and effectiveness in science and technology communication

TRESCA

Trustworthy, reliable, and engaging scientific communication approaches

MIRROR

Migration-related risks caused by misconceptions of opportunities and requirements

COMPROP

Computational Propaganda: Investigating the impact of algorithms and bots on political discourse in Europe

LEMAN

Deep learning on manifolds and graphs

Source: The Challenge of the European Union in the Face of Disinformation: Analysis and Assessment of European Projects Funded under the Horizon 2020 Programme, 2023.

Table 2. Coding table for in-depth interviews

Members of the research team

Fact-checkers

Researcher 1

A1

Fact-checker 1

B1

Researcher 2

A2

Fact-checker 2

B2

Researcher 3

A3

Fact-checker 3

B3

Researcher 4

A4

Fact-checker 4

B4

Researcher 5

A5

Source: Authors’ own compilation.

2.1. Transparency and ethical considerations in research

This study was conducted in accordance with the principles of methodological transparency and ethical rigour, in line with international recommendations for research in the Social Sciences. The methodological design and the protocol for data collection and analysis were approved by the Ethics Committee at the University of Navarra, ensuring protection of rights, privacy, anonymity, and compliance with the regulations on personal data protection.

The interviewees received detailed information on the objectives, scope and potential implications of their participation in the research. All provided their written informed consent, authorising the recording and analysis of their contributions, and guaranteeing the anonymous and exclusively academic use of the collected information.

Due to the exploratory and qualitative nature of this study, no formal pre-registration of the design or analysis plan was conducted on open access platforms. Nevertheless, the process of defining dimensions, categories and data coding was documented internally, thus ensuring coherence between objectives, theoretical framework and empirical evidence collected (coding available on request). This methodological flexibility responds to the inherent characteristics of qualitative research and the analysis of technology transfer in complex contexts such as European projects on media literacy and the fight against disinformation (Martínez, 2024; Bogers, et al., 2018).

3. Results

In order to comply with EU requirements, H2020 projects had to submit a plan with their intended dissemination actions. During the course of the project, the European Commission required continuous monitoring; and, prior to its completion, a report on the activities carried out.

Actions are key to transferring knowledge and providing society with technological tools to strengthen its media literacy. However, interviewees estimated that between 5% and 12% of each project’s budget was allocated to the dissemination plan, considering that the 13 projects selected in this analysis received a total of 32,545,083.65 euros (Molina-Lomba, et al., 2023).

For the content analysis, the different knowledge transfer actions were grouped into the following categories: dissemination channels, organisation and participation in events, academic publications, media mentions, collaborations with other projects, and technological tools developed.

3.1. Dissemination channels

The dissemination plans reveal that the projects devote a large part of their efforts to disseminating progress through a variety of channels. Table 3, which includes all the platforms associated with each project, shows that eleven of the twelve projects analysed have at least one active profile on social networks such as X, LinkedIn, Facebook or YouTube, among others. Among these, X stands out as the platform unanimously used by all. Furthermore, it is noted that 5 of the 12 projects have over one thousand followers on their official X accounts.

Table 3. Data collected in the first half of 2024 on project dissemination channels

Projects

Website

Social media followers

Newsletter editions

Blog posts

Audiovisual material

Graphic material

SOMA

Yes

X: 1,790

Over 60

4 videos

LinkedIn: 1,515

YouTube: 38

Provenance

Yes

X: 303

49

LinkedIn: 14

Facebook: 40

SocialTruth

Yes

X: 202

5

44

2 videos

2 posters

LinkedIn: 107

Facebook: 101

EUNOMIA

Not active

X: 391

6

22

13 videos

6 posters

WeVerify

Yes

X: 3,063

10

36 videos

YouTube: 285

SlideShare: 6

Co-Inform

Yes

X: 1,186

6

33 videos

2 posters

LinkedIn: 192

Facebook: 1,507

Fandango

Not active

X: 177

3

1 leaflet

1 banner

InVID

Yes

X: 4,852

3

2 leaflets

QUEST

Yes

X: 1,529

8

61

21 videos

LinkedIn: 427

Facebook: 731

6 podcasts

YouTube: 14

TRESCA

Yes

X: 854

12

1 video

YouTube: 15

MIRROR

Yes

X: 415

3

15

11 videos

LinkedIn: 561

YouTube: 14

COMPROP

Yes

X: 7,269 (does not have its own account)

Source: Authors’ own compilation based on data from reports, websites and social networks.

Popularisation on these platforms does not, however, guarantee effective knowledge transfer to society. Moreover, A1 points out that their project’s community of followers belongs to the professional or academic sphere. This can lead to overly technical language used in publications, which makes it difficult to arouse the interest of the average citizen. COMPROP does not have its own data, as its actions were carried out through the dissemination channels of DEMTECH, a company specialising in open innovation.

The European Commission sets a series of objectives depending on the call for proposals for each project. In the case of A2, they were approached from a technical perspective. In other words, their main interest was to raise awareness of the scientifically developed digital tool. Since the team was not interested in popularising the platform, they decided to carry out the minimum dissemination actions required to complete the project. However, they do acknowledge that, from a societal perspective, the results were not very successful. In contrast, A3 points out that such tools “reach the social sphere indirectly” and that it is important to consider the citizenry.

3.2. Events

Another aspect of note is the organisation of and participation in workshops, courses, presentations and webinars, which, according to A3, played a key role during the pandemic.

Figure 1 shows that the twelve projects analysed participated in an average of 56 events (m=56). Nevertheless, WeVerify and InVID stand out, with participation in events on 150 and 121 occasions, respectively. In this regard, A2 points out that their project was aimed at students. Therefore, in order to ensure quality interaction and specific figures to handle in terms of analysis, they chose to reduce the number of events organised. A5 clarifies that, although the events of their project did not exclude ordinary citizens, they were mainly aimed at professionals.

Figure 1. Organised events in which the projects participated

Source: Authors’ own compilation based on data from reports, websites and social networks.

Members of teams A4 and A5 indicated that the European calls for proposals, under which the projects analysed in this research were funded, aimed to provide knowledge and digital tools to the front line in the fight against disinformation—communication professionals—rather than to society as a whole. “We were at the beginning of this intensive fight and it was important to equip professionals to act faster and understand what was going on,” explained A3, adding that the approach taken was the right one at the time.

In turn, A4 noted that their project events were aimed at the European scientific community, whose cultural and linguistic differences made it difficult to reach out to the general public. They also acknowledge that it would have been necessary to organise more events with external collaborators, but, to do so, they required a larger budget to allow them to bring in event experts.

3.3. Scientific publications

In addition to social dissemination, A4 points out that the EU requires each project to publish academic articles to enrich the scientific community. As relevant data shown in Figure 2, the projects published an average of 18.67 articles (m=18.67), with MIRROR publishing the most, with a total of 38, and Fandango the least, with 7.

Figure 2. Scientific publications linked to each project

Source: Authors’ own compilation based on data from reports, websites and social networks.

The fact-checking professionals interviewed agree that universities and academia play a key role in the fight against disinformation, even though the standard pace of scientific publication limits rapid dissemination. In other words, they recognise the contributions of projects through academic journals, but publication times make knowledge transfer less effective. In many cases, they see the contribution of academic articles as a scientific endorsement of issues that professionals already knew or sensed.

In addition, B3 adds that the methodology employed by the University and its extensive experience in experimental science provides real value to the research, which, in their opinion, would lose impact without the data provided by fact-checking platforms, since they are essential for steering the academic research apparatus toward the most relevant topics. B4 states that collaboration between entities is essential; however, in their case, almost no university approached them to work together. Ultimately, they argue that each stakeholder is fighting disinformation on their own, making it difficult to achieve a significant impact.

3.4. The media

Despite the rise of social media, traditional media outlets remain a key ally for connecting with society. Figure 3 reveals that the projects received an average of 19.16 mentions (m=19.16). Once again, the heterogeneity of the data is striking, which raises several questions: not all projects have placed the same importance on media dissemination; the media outlets themselves are not interested in the projects; or the mentions may not be available in a web format.

Figure 3. Media mentions

Source: Authors’ own compilation based on data from reports, websites and social networks.

The researchers interviewed agree that they maintained a good relationship with them. A1 notes that “the media were more effective at helping us reach the professional community than the general public. And continues: “However, we tried to show them what was most important and useful for them to communicate to their general audience”.

A2 estimates that 5-6% of their team’s efforts were devoted to dissemination. In terms of time, they feel that more was dedicated than should have been, since they, as a researcher, assumed the bulk of the media attention. Thus, they note the importance of having multidisciplinary teams made up of communication professionals whose work focuses on raising awareness of the project. This request is in line with that of the fact-checkers.

A4 considers that, although one of their partners was exclusively tasked with communicating developments to society, interest continued to fall within the scientific and professional community, and the impact on society was not as desired. This is confirmed by A1 and A2, who also had communication partners.

3.5. Collaboration with other projects

Each project established partnerships with other consortia. From a strategic perspective, these actions contribute to fostering scientific and technological progress, a fundamental objective of the EU.

From the point of view of A1, collaboration is highly useful, as it builds links to exchange knowledge of mutual interest. Together with A4, they recognise that, thanks to these partnerships, they enable each project’s audience to learn about others, thereby amplifying the visibility of their progress, as was the aim of the TRESCA-RETHINK collaboration (see Table 4), which culminated in a joint final event.

Table 4. Noteworthy projects with which they have collaborated

Projects

Collaborations

SOMA

Truly Media, AI4DIGNITY, Provenance, SocialTruth, Eunomia, Co-Inform and Fandango

Provenance

SOMA and WeVerify

SocialTruth

SOMA, WeVerify, EUNOMIA

EUNOMIA

ARTICONF, HELIOS, Provenance, SocialTruth, SOMA, Co-Inform and WeVerify

WeVerify

Provenance, EUNOMIA, InVID and Truly Media

Co-Inform

EUNOMIA, SOMA and EMO

Fandango

SOMA, MediaFutures, AI4Media and EMO

InVID

WeVerify

QUEST

INJECT, Global Alliance for Media Innovation, Rethink, Concise and TRESCA

TRESCA

RETHINK, GlobalSCAPE, CONCISE, QUEST, NEWSERA, ENJOI, TRESCA, PARCOS and Iberifier

MIRROR

CRITERIA, The EU-project Perceptions, The Cooperativa Finis Terrae, The EU-project, ITFLOWS and DISKOW

COMPROP

InfoActivism and OxTECH

Source: Authors’ own compilation based on data from reports, websites and social networks.

Table 4 shows the formation of partnerships between the twelve selected projects. The SOMA project stands out in particular, having collaborated with up to five others, thus demonstrating a high level of cooperation and strategic exchange. Moreover, H2020 projects not only collaborated with each other, but also with external entities, as shown in table 4. In the case of A2, their project established a partnership with a leading social journalism platform, which actively contributed to the launch of one of their pilot programmes.

Regarding the success of these partnerships, A3 highlights that the initiative launched by their project, in collaboration with another of the twelve analysed, has become “a widely used tool, which, by the end of the project, was used by over 50,000 professionals worldwide”. Therefore, it can be determined that collaboration was a key factor in increasing its reach within the professional community.

Similarly, A4 explains that collaborations can lead to initiatives that continue through new projects, preventing progress from disappearing when they end—a key dynamic in the fight against a growing and diversifying phenomenon.

3.6. Technological tools

The results of the projects represent the mechanisms that enable society to develop media literacy and minimise the impact of disinformation in everyday life. A3 points out that “the most distinctive way to help the fight against disinformation is through tools—tools that are genuinely useful”. Figure 4 groups project initiatives, recorded in dissemination plans, websites and social media, into three categories.

Figure 4. Initiatives developed by the projects

Source: Authors’ own compilation based on data from reports, websites and social networks.

With regard to verification systems—including plug-ins, fake news detection services and widgets, among others, it was observed that all twelve projects (100%) invested in developing at least one. In addition, nine of the twelve projects (75%) created new platforms such as apps, websites or innovative social networks. Finally, Figure 4 also shows that the EUNOMIA, QUEST and TRESCA projects (25%) produced user manuals for professionals or training courses, which are considered practical material in this research.

A3 indicates that the tools developed by their project addressed disinformation in various formats, including text, multimedia, images, and videos. Regarding the target audience, they add that these initiatives were designed to assist individuals specialised in the field of disinformation, as were the projects of the other four interviewees. In fact, they note that some of these initiatives were useful “not only for professionals but also for academic staff and human rights organisations, among others”.

After the project was completed, A4 and their team recognised that equipping society with efficient tools was a priority. They believe their project within the Horizon 2020 framework constituted preliminary research on disinformation, which allowed them to familiarise themselves with the field of study and, from there, determine the most suitable approach. Thus, they explain that their subsequent project, which follows that analysed in this study, focuses on the media literacy of citizens. Furthermore, they believe in technology and its use, but consider that the most important thing is to support people, as they are convinced that the most effective way to fight disinformation is through the training and empowerment of the citizenry.

As a fact-checking professional, B1 acknowledges that fact-checkers try to understand how these tools can help them be faster and more efficient in their work. However, B2 believes that most tools intended for these professionals go unused because, in their view, the end-user has not had the opportunity to influence their development or to express whether they are truly useful for them. Furthermore, they explain that the moment tools which have received institutional funding are presented to them, numerous problems become apparent—problems that could have been easily identified during the design phase. “It constantly results in tools that are designed with the best of intentions but go unused because the end-user decides it’s not worth their while,” they note.

Nevertheless, according to B2, there are also success stories, such as that of the InVID project. The tool developed is used within its parent verification platform. They emphasize that it provides a service previously unavailable to newsrooms and which currently functions effectively. As explained by B2, InVID was launched in 2016, at a time when disinformation was starting to gain popularity. In their view, however, they managed to identify the need and orient the project outward, turning advanced technical research into useful tools for the general public.

4. Discussion

The analysis confirms that all projects have dissemination plans in place, in compliance with the requirements of the H2020 Programme. The strategies employed mainly include the creation of websites, the publication of reports and dissemination materials, the organisation of academic and social events, as well as an active presence on social networks such as X, LinkedIn, Facebook or YouTube. These actions aim to give visibility to the results and facilitate interaction with diverse audiences.

A diffuse and poorly structured model is observed in the communication activities, with notable differences in implementation. This heterogeneity makes it difficult to collect, compare and evaluate data. Although the initiatives were executed, they show limitations: the absence of a common strategic approach, poor adaptation of knowledge into accessible language, and a scarcity of mechanisms to measure effectiveness.

Inequalities are also identified in funding for dissemination, which ranges from 5% to 12% of the total budget, raising doubts as to whether these resources are sufficient to develop strategies to ensure effective knowledge transfer. Considering that the total budget of the selected projects amounts to several tens of millions of euros, as indicated in ‘El desafío de la Unión Europea ante la desinformación: análisis y balance de los proyectos europeos financiados en el marco del Programa Horizonte 2020’ [The Challenge of the European Union in the Face of Disinformation: Analysis and Assessment of European Projects Funded under the Horizon 2020 Programme], the proportion of the budget allocated to communication may be too limited to achieve a significant impact (Molina-Lomba, et al., 2023).

Concrete dissemination actions—such as social media activity, event organisation, or media relations—appear to respond more to a box-ticking exercise than to an effective knowledge transfer strategy. The fact-checkers interviewed agree that the mere existence of these channels does not guarantee that the message will effectively reach society. In order to do so, it is essential to translate scientific findings into accessible and understandable language, and to involve communication professionals who can design and implement effective outreach strategies.

Roca-Marín and Pardo-Quiles, based on data provided by the FECYT [Spanish Foundation for Science and Technology], note that the population’s low interest in science is “more than enough reason to confront the important challenge of establishing more relatable and accessible methodologies to reach society” (2023, p. 287).

Furthermore, the importance of strengthening academic collaboration between researchers, fact-checkers and other relevant stakeholders is stressed. The experience gathered demonstrates that integrating multidisciplinary teams and cooperating with fact-checking platforms and media outlets, improves the social impact of projects. In this regard, it is advisable to promote the creation of networks that facilitate connection between the scientific community and the public.

Finally, project continuity is key; sustained funding allows for the consolidation of the digital tools that have been developed. Currently, projects must seek out entities to back their operation, maintenance, and continuous improvement, which makes it difficult to adapt to evolving disinformation. This underlines the need for long-term, sustainable support to ensure their permanence and create genuine value for the community.

5. Conclusions

The research confirms the hypothesis that, although Horizon 2020 projects developed strategies aimed at initial knowledge transfer, they lack the necessary effectiveness to drive media literacy on a large scale, which hinders the citizenry’s ability to combat disinformation. Although efforts are acknowledged, challenges persist in the projects’ effectiveness, reach, and capacity to strengthen society’s critical thinking.

This situation generates a perception of dissatisfaction among researchers and fact-checking professionals, who stress the need to reinforce the communicative dimension of the projects. A more robust communication strategy, based on transparency and accessibility, would increase knowledge transfer and contribute more effectively to media literacy and democratic resilience against disinformation.

The study confirms the relevance of the European Union’s requirement to develop communication plans, but it underscores the need for future framework programmes to advance towards an institutional homogenisation of the design, development, and evaluation of these strategies. A common framework would serve as a reference for all projects, fostering comparability between initiatives, the optimisation of impact assessment, and the identification of replicable good practices.

The main limitations include the gender imbalance in the sample, with only two women out of nine interviewees. This under-representation of women in leadership positions reflects a widely documented problem in STEM and digital verification (European Institute for Gender Equality, 2023), which can affect the diversity of perspectives in the design of technological tools. Moreover, digital harassment targeting female journalists and fact-checkers constitutes an additional barrier that restricts their active participation (Pérez-Pereiro et al., 2024). Although this aspect is not the central focus of the study, it is relevant to guide future research.

Overall, the results indicate that the H2020 projects marked a starting point in European research on disinformation, prioritising the development of tools for fact-checking professionals and placing the direct promotion of citizen media literacy on the back burner. This initial emphasis can be explained by the limited understanding of the phenomenon in its early stages, which led to a strategy focused on providing specialised stakeholders with useful resources, creating an indirect impact on society.

For future research, it will be essential to analyse the successor programmes to Horizon 2020, paying particular attention to the evolution of communication strategies, the incorporation of data management transparency mechanisms, evaluation processes, potential changes in project sustainability, and the strengthening of actions aimed at media literacy. It is also recommended to measure the projects’ impact on society through statistical analysis with specialised software in order to expand upon and complement the findings from other methodological perspectives, thereby reinforcing the robustness and comparability of the conclusions.

Authors’ contribution

Beatriz Molina-Lomba: Conceptualization; Data Curation; Formal Analysis; Investigation; Methodology; Project Management; Resources; Validation; Writing - original draft; Writing - review and editing; Supervision; Funding Acquisition. Jordi Rodríguez-Virgili: Conceptualization; Investigation; Methodology; Resources; Validation; Writing - review and editing. Jorge-Miguel Rodríguez-Rodríguez: Conceptualization; Investigation; Methodology; Resources; Validation; Writing - review and editing. The authors have read and agree with the published version of the manuscript.

Conflicts of interest

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Acknowledgements

This research is the result of collaboration between two research groups specialized in the study of disinformation: 'Journalism, Political Communication and Democracy' (PerComPolDem) at the University of Navarra, and 'Communication, Journalism, Politics and Citizenship' (S03_23R) at the University San Jorge, the latter recognized as a reference group and funded by the Department of Education, Science and Universities of the Government of Aragon. The authors acknowledge the exchange of knowledge among the members of both groups.

Data availability

Data generated and analysed during this study (interviews with researchers and fact-checkers) are available from the corresponding authors upon reasonable request. This practice ensures the transparency of the research while upholding the participants’ confidentiality.

References

Astudillo-Muñoz, Jorge. (2024). Desinformación: aproximación conceptual, riesgos y remedios. Derecho PUCP, (93), 55-97. https://doi.org/10.18800/derechopucp.202402.002

Aufderheide, Patricia. (1993). Media literacy. A report of the National Leadership Conference on Media Literacy. Washington, DC: Aspen Institute, Communications and Society Program.

Becerra-Basterrechea, Beatriz. (2022). El papel disruptivo de la desinformación en la agenda de la Unión Europea. Un análisis de actores, intereses y decisiones. [Tesis Doctoral, UAM]. Biblos-e Archivo.

Bogers, Marcel; Chesbrough, Henry; & Moedas, Carlos. (2018). Innovación abierta: investigación, prácticas y políticas. California Management Review, 60(2), 5-16. https://doi.org/10.1177/0008125617745086

Bustos-Díaz, Javier; & Martin-Vicario, Lara. (2024). Alfabetización mediática en un mundo hiperconectado: de las redes sociales a la Inteligencia Artificial. European Public & Social Innovation Review, 9, 1-17. https://doi.org/10.31637/epsir-2024-1241

Chandra, Vinesh. (2019). Share Engage Educate: SEEding change for a better world. Brill.

Comisión Europea. (2017). Horizon 2020. Work Programme 2016-2017. 16. https://bit.ly/4fDK4gE

De-Saint-Laurent, Constance; Murphy, Gilian; Hegarty, Karem; & Greene, Ciara M. (2022). Measuring the effects of misinformation exposure and beliefs on behavioural intentions: A COVID-19 vaccination study. Cognitive Research, 7, 87. https://doi.org/10.1186/s41235-022-00437-y

European Institute for Gender Equality. (2023). Gender equality index 2023: Country profiles. European Institute for Gender Equality. https://eige.europa.eu/gender-equality-index/2023/country

Foro Económico Mundial (FEM). (2025, 15 de enero). Informe de Riesgos Globales 2025: Conflictos, medioambiente y desinformación, principales amenazas [Comunicado de prensa]. https://bit.ly/46TXP8M

Freelon, Deen; & Wells, Chris. (2020). Disinformation as political communication. Political Communication, 37(2), 145–156. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2020.1723755

Galindo, Jesús; Sanz, Pedro; & De Benito, Juan José. (2011). La universidad ante el reto de la transferencia del conocimiento 2.0: análisis de las herramientas digitales a disposición del gestor de transferencia. Investigaciones europeas de dirección y economía de la empresa, 17(3), 111-126. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1135-2523(12)60123-3

García-Gordillo, Mar; Genaut, Aingeru; & Rodríguez Amat, José Ramón. (2025). La transferencia en comunicación, paso final de la investigación. Textual & Visual Media, 19(1), 1-4. https://doi.org/10.56418/txt.19.1.2025.0

García-Roca, Anastasio; & de-Amo-Sánchez-Fortún, José Manuela. (2023). La alfabetización mediática e informacional en un contexto de desinformación. Tejuelo, 37, 99-128. https://doi.org/10.17398/1988-8430.37.99

Genaut-Arratibel, Aingeru; Suárez-Villegas, Juan-Carlos; & Cantalapiedra, María-José. (2022). “Universities and knowledge transfer in the communication field. Letter”. Profesional de la Información, 31(6), e310608. https://doi.org/10.3145/epi.2022.nov.08

Gertrudix, Manuel; Rajas, Mario; Gertrudis-Casado, María-del-Carmen; & Gálvez-de-la-Cuesta, María-del-Carmen. (2020). Gestión de la comunicación científica de los proyectos de investigación en H2020. Funciones, modelos y estrategias. Profesional de la Información, 29(4), 1-13. https://doi.org/10.3145/epi.2020.jul.24

High level Group on fake news and online disinformation (HLEG). (2018). A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation. European Union. https://bit.ly/4gHmRuZ

Livingstone, Sonia. (2004). Media literacy and the challenge of new information and communication technologies. The communication review, 7(1), 3-14. https://doi.org/10.1080/10714420490280152

Martínez, Carolina. (2024). La flexibilidad en el proceso de investigación cualitativa: recapitulación sobre el análisis institucional de un programa de alfabetización infantil. [Ponencia presentada en las XII Jornadas de Sociología]. Universidad Nacional de La Plata, Argentina.

Martínez-Madrigal, Jenny-Paola; Puerto-Zabala, Paola-Yesenia; & Présiga-Vargas, Carlos-Alberto. (2022). El docente investigador como factor de transformación de la sociedad: reflexión sobre su papel en la construcción de saberes, su propia práctica y la construcción de redes de conocimiento. Revista Oratores, (17), 117-126. https://doi.org/10.37594/oratores.n17.697

Mazur, Viktoria; & Chochia, Archil. (2022). Definition and regulation as an effective measure to fight fake news in the European Union. European Studies, 9(1), 15-40. https://doi.org/10.2478/eustu-2022-0001

McKay, Spencer; & Tenove, Chris. (2021). Disinformation as a threat to deliberative democracy. Political Research Quarterly, 74(3), 703–717. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912920938143

Molina-Lomba, Beatriz; Rodríguez-Rodríguez, Jorge-Miguel; & Rodríguez-Virgili, Jordi. (2023). El desafío de la Unión Europea ante la desinformación: análisis y balance de los proyectos europeos financiados en el marco del Programa Horizonte 2020. En Dafonte-Gómez, Alberto y Míguez-González, María-Isabel (coords.). El fenómeno de la desinformación: reflexiones, casos y propuestas. (pp. 13-35). Dykinson, S. L.

Pérez-Pereiro, Marta; Moreno-Gil, Victoria; & Salgado-de-Dios, Francesc. (2024). Gendered disinformation in Spanish-language fact-checking: origin, methodology and perspectives. Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico, 30(3), 477-487. https://doi.org/10.5209/emp.96379

Perkmann, Markus; Tartari, Valentina; McKelvey, Maureen; Autio, Erkko; Broström, Anders; D’Este, Pablo; Fini, Riccardo; Geuna, Aldo; Grimaldi, Rosa; Hughes, Alan; Krabel, Stefan; Kitson, Michael; Llerena, Patrick; Lissoni, Franceso; Salter, Ammon; & Sobrero, Maurizio. (2013). Academic engagement and commercialisation: A review of the literature on university–industry relations. Research Policy, 42(2), 423–442. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2012.09.007

Roca-Marín, Delfina; & Pardo-Quiles, Verónica. (2023). Análisis de la idoneidad del microrrelato en la divulgación científica. Círculo de Lingüística Aplicada a la Comunicación, 95, 287-299. https://doi.org/10.5209/clac.74307

Sádaba, Charo; & Salaverría, Ramón. (2023). Combatir la desinformación con alfabetización mediática: análisis de las tendencias en la Unión Europea. Revista Latina De Comunicación Social (81), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.4185/RLCS-2023-1552

Sánchez-González, María; Cea-Esteruelas, Nereida; Sánchez-Gonzales, Hada; & Palomo, Bella. (2024). Transferencia como práctica y misión en proyectos de investigación universitarios sobre desinformación. Profesional de la información, 33(3), e330308. https://doi.org/10.3145/epi.2024.0308

Seijas, Raquel. (2020). Las soluciones europeas a la desinformación y su riesgo de impacto en los derechos fundamentales. Revista de Internet, Derecho y Política, (31), 1-14. https://doi.org/10.7238/idp.v0i31.3205

Tejedor, Santiago; & Sancho-Ligorred, Belén. (2023). Cartografía mundial de herramientas, fact-checkers y proyectos contra la infodemia. Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico, 29(4), 933-942. https://doi.org/10.5209/esmp.87838

Tribunal de Cuentas Europeo (Ed.). (2021). El impacto de la desinformación en la UE: una cuestión abordada, pero no atajada. Tribunal de Cuentas Europeo. http://bit.ly/4h3NawL

UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization). (2020, November 3). Seoul Declaration on Media and Information Literacy for Everyone and by Everyone: A Defence against Disinfodemics. Seoul: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. https://bit.ly/48JltqP

Varguillas-Carmona, Carmen-Siavil; & Ribot-de-Flores, Silvia. (2007). Implicaciones conceptuales y metodológicas en la aplicación de la entrevista en profundidad. Laurus, 13(23), 249-262. https://bit.ly/4gwqdl1